


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THE ROUNDOUT PROGRAM: IS IT STILL VALID?

BY

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
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THE ROUNDOUT PROGRAM: IS IT STILL VALID? (u)

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

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## ABSTRACT

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Early in the morning on the 2nd of August 1990 the country of Kuwait was invaded by armored divisions of neighboring Iraq. Twenty-four hours later, Iraqi troops were positioned on the border of Saudi Arabia. On the 3th of August Saudi Arabia requested U.S. military assistance. Two of the first active Army combat units alerted for and subsequently deployed to the Persian Gulf were the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, divisions with Army National Guard combat roundout brigades. On the 22nd of August 1990, the first Reserve Component units were mobilized. Specifically excluded from the call-up authority were combat elements, to include the roundout brigades of the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions. This case study examines the historical perspectives of Roundout, decisions surrounding the initial nonactivation of these units and the future role of combat roundout units in the Total Force Policy. The case study is built on official documents and publications, plus survey data provided by various State Adjutant Generals. Recommendations range from elimination of the Roundout Program to the placement of roundout units at Corps level.

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## INTRODUCTION

Since 1979 numerous active Army and Reserve Component (RC) units have shared a variety of affiliations through the CAPSTONE Program. CAPSTONE is divided into three separate and distinct training relationships. These are peacetime command and control, WARTRAIN, and the Directed Training Association (DTA). CAPSTONE is a flexible program designed to meet the present and future needs of the Army. CAPSTONE training encompasses all activities which support improved proficiency in accomplishing wartime missions and is normally geared toward that which develops an RC unit's ability to function as a part of a larger military organization. The interlocking functioning of wartime organizational relationships, peacetime command and control and training associations are fundamental to the success of the CAPSTONE Program.<sup>1</sup>

While all CAPSTONE programs are designed to develop meaningful training relationships, the DTA probably receives the greatest share of attention by all components, for contained within are the Affiliation and Roundout Programs.

Affiliation is an association designed to increase training readiness of RC units through association with like-type Active Component (AC) units.<sup>2</sup> These associations are designed to provide a dedicated year-round training relationship between the

RC and AC unit.

Roundout, a special type of CAPSTONE relationship, is specifically designed to allow RC units to become an integral part of larger sized AC and RC units.<sup>3</sup> Upon mobilization, Roundout units complete the force structure of that larger AC or RC unit and bring it up to a designated organizational structure. Active Component gaining command commanders provide wartime mission guidance, approve Mission Essential Task Lists (METL), provide training guidance and priorities for wartime mission planning, review training programs, review unit status reports, recommend force structure and integration actions, and conduct the actual Annual Training (AT) evaluation.<sup>4</sup> Other significant aspects of the program are; that RC units are assigned a priority for allocation of resources equal to that of the AC sponsor unit; and Roundout units will be scheduled to deploy with their AC sponsor or, as soon as possible thereafter, according to supported CINC priorities.<sup>5</sup>

Units linked together by the Roundout program normally develop a symbiotic relationship comparable to those of AC battalions in the same brigade. While most of the programs' emphasis is placed on the RC/AC connection, the RC/RC relationship is just as significant. Currently there are 27 RC units being roundedout by other RC units.

#### ORIGINS AND HISTORY

The origins of Roundout are deeply rooted in American history. While the CAPSTONE program itself may be "relatively"

new, the Roundout concept is not. In 1908 the War Department developed a program that called for integration of Regular Army and National Guard units located in the same geographic area. The first of such units came into effect in 1910 when three divisions were organized from Regular Army and National Guard units stationed in the New England states.<sup>6</sup> Two years later the concept was abandoned and Regular Army and National Guard units began reorganizing into componental divisions. Under the new plan Regular Army units were reorganized into tactical divisions for use as expeditionary forces while National Guard divisions mobilized and trained for deployment.<sup>7</sup>

For the next several years the Regular Army struggled with trying to expand itself rather than relying on and equipping the National Guard in time of war. In 1916 everything changed when Congress passed the National Defense Act which required the Guard to be organized and equipped in consonance with Regular Army tables of organization and equipment. By the beginning of World War I the Guard had 12 infantry divisions and was called upon to organize 6 more.

Eleven Guard divisions deployed to France making up 40% of the divisional strength of the American Expeditionary Force. In a report issued by the German High Command at the end of the War, eight U.S. divisions were rated as either excellent or superior, six of them were Guard divisions.<sup>8</sup>

With the 1920 National Defense Act, the National Guard reorganized again, this time on a regional basis. The previously organized 18 infantry divisions were joined by four cavalry

divisions. In the mid-1930's the Guard activated its first separate brigade.

During the World War II years, a significant event occurred that affected the current organization and composition of National Guard units. The plan, originally proposed in 1908 to combine Regular Army and National Guard units, was reborn when three Regular Army divisions were assigned National Guard regiments to "round" them out prior to their commitment to the war effort. This association continued throughout the remaining war years.

While World War II did not cause immediate growth in the total number of Guard divisions, post-war reorganization did. The National Guard force structure expanded from 18-27 divisions. This structure remained in effect until the 1960's when all but eight divisions were either inactivated or downsized to separate brigades.

Utilization of National Guard units during the Vietnam war was token, at best. Seventy-six units were mobilized, but only 43 ever deployed to Vietnam. The non-deployed units were initially used as part of the Strategic Reserve Force.<sup>9</sup> As U.S. involvement continued however, unit integrity of the non-deployed RC units was violated when their personnel were used as "fillers" for units already operating in Vietnam.

As the Vietnam War drew to a close, the active Army entered its traditional, post-war "downsizing" era. In 1968, at the height of the war, active Army end strength totaled 1,570,343.<sup>10</sup> By 1974 the end strength was down to 782,897,

only 10% more than the authorized strength of 781,000.<sup>11</sup> As end strength decreased so did the number of AC units. The Department of Defense faced the dilemma of retaining a force structure capable of responding to crisis situations and, if required, expanding for protracted engagements. The potential solution pointed toward stronger reliance and utilization of RC units.

In August of 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, set forth his Total Force Concept. A concept designed, in part, to utilize abundant resources available in the Reserves. In 1973, after several years of careful study, concept became policy, the Total Force Policy (TFP). With birth of the TFP came the rebirth of the long forgotten Roundout concept. The twist this time however, called for understrength AC divisions to be assigned an Army National Guard (ARNG) unit and for that unit to become an integral part of the division during peacetime. This special relationship appealed to leadership of both components. The Army retained divisions and the Army Guard gained assurances of being resourced and ultimately employed as units rather than filler personnel. The National Guard Bureau approved and accepted the plan that same year.

The first affiliation was between the 29th Separate Infantry Brigade, Hawaii Army National Guard (ARNG) and the 25th Infantry Division. The initial test proved so successful that two years later the Army decided to roundout the 5th and 24th Infantry Divisions. Army National Guard units chosen were the 256th Infantry Brigade, Louisiana ARNG and 48th Infantry Brigade,

Georgia ARNG respectively. In the 1980's ARNG Roundout units were added to the 1st Cavalry, 4th Infantry, 9th Infantry, and 10th Infantry Divisions. Army National Guard units chosen were the 155th Armored Brigade, Mississippi ARNG, 116th Cavalry Brigade, Oregon Nevada/Idaho ARNG, 31st Infantry Brigade Washington ARNG, and 27th Infantry Brigade, New York ARNG.<sup>12</sup> Of the 60 total Roundout affiliations, 33 are with active Army units.

#### PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

While many questions may be asked with regard to Roundout, we believe the most relevant is, "Does the Roundout Program function as intended?" To obtain an evaluation of the programs effectiveness, at least from a National Guard perspective, a survey was conducted with The Adjutant Generals (TAG)s whose States have roundout brigades. A copy of the survey is contained as appendix A.

Survey results provided information about the effectiveness of Roundout, training priorities, support required from active component sponsor divisions, future roundout missions, and other questions directed not only toward determining the effectiveness of the Roundout Program, but potential future missions and force structure for the Army National Guard. While not sent to every State, we feel the survey was sufficiently representative to conclude that Roundout does work and should be continued. To

quote one Adjutant General:

The roundout concept is a very positive approach for training and preparation for war.

However, having said the program works and should be continued, the TAGs also felt that more routine AC sponsor support in the form of mobile training teams (MTT)s, equipment, and participation in major training exercises would enhance the training effectiveness of their roundout units. Specifics of the support referred to by the TAGs are outlined in FORSCOM Program Budget Guidance. It states that active Army sponsors are to provide the following:

- \* MTTs that support RC training needs which are required to train in the RC units METL.
- \* MTT support that allows AC personnel to make six three-day trips per training year.
- \* Annual Training Assistance in the form of a tailored task force of AC personnel and equipment to provide annual training assistance in support of the RC units' annual training plan.
- \* Two three-day liaison/coordination visits for each RC battalion/separate company/detachment per year.<sup>13</sup>

While the above requirements do not outwardly appear overwhelming, AC sponsor units experience difficulty when attempting to provide the required support. It is our contention that AC sponsors are not intentionally avoiding their responsibilities, but, rather, are unable to provide it because of their own training and support requirements. Whatever the reason or reasons may be, roundout training readiness is affected!

But what about active Army leadership, what is their perception of the Roundout Program? From 1983-1985 GEN H. Norman Schwartzkopf, CINCCENT, commanded the 24th Infantry Division, a division roundedout by the 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia ARNG. GEN Schwartzkopf's opinion of his roundout unit was outwardly displayed when he stated:

Roundout is a fact of life...the 48th Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, is the third brigade of my division...I expect them to fight alongside us. They have demonstrated (their capability) through three demanding rotations at the National Training Center...they are, in fact, combat ready...

But is this sentiment really shared by the remainder of the active Army? Recent mobilization of Reserve Component units to support Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, indicate military leadership may have certain apprehensions about combat roundout units. Over the years the Army developed numerous contingency plans with roundout units being activated and deployed with or immediately following their AC sponsor. But, when the first opportunity arose to test the plans, the Army very tactfully declined.

Early in the morning on the 2nd of August 1990 the country of Kuwait was invaded by armored divisions of neighboring Iraq. Twenty-four hours later Kuwait and all her riches belonged to Iraq; the ruling government had been deposed; Iraqi troops were positioned on the border of Saudi Arabia. Five days later, the U.N. Security Council voted 13-0 to impose a trade embargo on Iraq. Six days after the Iraqi invasion, with Saudi Arabian consent, U.S. forces were ordered to Saudi Arabia. Two of the

first active Army combat units alerted for and subsequently deployed to the Persian Gulf were the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions; divisions with National Guard combat roundout brigades.

On the 22nd of August 1990, approximately three weeks after the invasion of Kuwait, the first reserve component units were mobilized. Specifically excluded from the call-up authority were RC combat roundout units. Consequently, two active Army brigades, the 197th Infantry Brigade, from Fort Benning, Georgia and 2nd Brigade, 2nd Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas were sent to the Persian Gulf with the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions respectively.

Why weren't the Division's roundout units activated? The Department of Defense position regarding exclusion of combat units was quite clear .

The major reason...for not calling the roundout combat units was that additional training would be required before the Army National Guard brigades could be deployed---training that would slow their deployment. Because of the limitation on the President's authority to call the reserves to 90 days plus a 90 day extension any reserve call up would be limited to 180 days---meaning the reservists would no sooner be trained and sent to Saudi Arabia than they would have to be flown back and demobilized. The reserve combat units, the reasoning says, would be limited utility in this contingency operation because of the short time they would be available.<sup>14</sup>

Immediate objections were raised by Guard and Congressional leadership and were best summed up by U.S. Representatives Les Aspin, Beverly Byron and G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery in a study they

co-authored called Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Reserve Components:  
Missing Lessons for a Future Force Structure.

The country is just beginning a great debate on the makeup of its military forces for the future. Central to that debate is the role of the reserves, particularly in the Army. For the last 17 years, the armed forces of the United States have been organized under the Total Force concept which would integrate active and reserve components in time of hostilities....This Total Force concept has never been tested.

Operation DESERT SHIELD, mounted in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, offers the opportunity to test this concept on which the nation has spent tens of billions of defense dollars. So far, the Department of Defense has called up relatively small numbers of combat support units...from the reserve components, but no combat units. The opportunity for a test of the Total Force policy has been largely ignored.

On August 22, based on an executive order of President Bush, the Secretary of Defense authorized the involuntary ordering to active duty of approximately 50,000 reservists under section 673b of Title 10, US Code. This statute authorizes the President, without a declaration of national emergency, to order up to 200,000 reservists to active duty at any one time for a period of up to 90 days, with a possible extension of an additional 90 days.

Secretary of Defense Cheney authorized the following call-up:

Army. No more than 25,000 members of the Army National Guard and the Army reserve, limited to providing "combat support and combat service support"

The Army called Army National Guard and Army Reserve combat support and combat service support units, predominantly supply, maintenance, transportation, military police and medical, to augment and support active forces.

In Operation DESERT SHIELD, the Department of Defense has had a unique opportunity to test the reserve system----including combat, combat support, and combat service support units----as a part of the Total Force. To this point the pentagon has chosen not do do so.

If the reserve component roundout units are not to be used, or are deemed unusable, when a short-notice war appears possible, then the viability of the whole concept may be considered suspect. This would carry profound implications for the organization of the Armed Forces of the United States in the future.<sup>15</sup>

Whether justified or not, a potentially dangerous precedence was set when the Department of Defense deliberately chose not to activate combat Roundout units with the first group of RC units called. The call-up of combat roundout units finally occurred in November of 1990. The brigades activated were the 48th Infantry Brigade, GA ARNG; the 155th Armored Brigade; and the 256th Infantry Brigade, LA ARNG. There was a caveat however, all were to be given "workup" at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California prior to any "deployment" decision.

While we cannot predict the future, it's important that past mistakes with regard to non-utilization of Roundout are avoided. The balance of this Study attempts to present ways of avoiding those mistakes.

#### CURRENT PERSPECTIVES

Recent events concerning CAPSTONE alignments, mobilization, and deployment of the RC speak for themselves. There's no need to rehash the events from a hindsight perspective. Significant

analysis of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM by the media, congress, and the military is resulting in identifying revolutionary planning alternatives for the decision makers. It's easy to find some very creative thought processes and suggestions for consideration. A great deal of strategic thinking is now taking place. Staff members of select congressional committees and military planners realize the Army will not return to a pre-Persian Gulf crisis mode of operation. Changes will be made and meaningful action taken.

The time for action has come, instead of asking, "Where do we go from here?", we should be saying, "Where do we want to go from here?" Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Carl Vuono has clearly charted the Army course with his six imperatives:

- \* High quality soldiers
- \* Powerful war-fighting doctrine
- \* Proper force mix
- \* Tough, realistic training
- \* Continuous modernization
- \* Leaders of unmatched ability <sup>16</sup>

Major General Donald Burdick, Director, Army National Guard, has initiated a future planning process allowing the Army National Guard to actively manage its future. In his long-range planning guidance all six CSA imperatives are supported. In addition the State missions of the ARNG will be accomplished concurrently.<sup>17</sup>

Prior to the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis, planning, programming, and budgeting actions necessary to reflect projected

geopolitical changes were slowly evolving. The change in the Soviet threat and its rippling effect throughout the world was being dealt with. Doomsday prophets warned of a trick. However, the Wall came down, the Iron Curtain melted and the dreaded Warsaw Pact Organization was officially dissolved on 21 February 1991. That is not to say America should become complacent with regard to Soviet capability. Nevertheless, we have been blessed with a cold war victory. A window of opportunity for change is a reality. We now have breathing room to plan for the future. The Gulf crisis aside, America's military forces can and must take steps to be "leaner and meaner".

The ARNG must be an active member in shaping and implementing the nation's new strategic military policy. What to do and how we go about it are two questions that must be addressed. Concrete solutions, while possible, may not be desirable. Too many variables prevent identifying specific problems and their solutions. However, a decision path can be formulated and applied to the spectrum of contingencies

During the 1970's, with guidance and direction from Congress and senior military leaders, the CAPSTONE alignment program infused the ARNG with a meaningful mission focus. The Guard received increased funding, up-to-date equipment, realigned force structure, and increases in quantity and quality of manpower. More and more units and individuals attained a combat capable status. The labels of "weekend warrior" and unskilled, untrained citizen soldier are now seldom heard. The active Army recognizes the Guard is ready and capable to support, fight, and win.

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq caught the diplomatic, political and military leaders by surprise, but not unprepared for a quick response. As a result of professional advice from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-In-Chief initiated the mechanism of a military response.

Many lessons will be learned as a result of the Persian Gulf crisis. Solutions to identified problem areas of mobilization, deployment, and employment of military forces as a result of an actual contingency will be significant. As units were mobilized and deployed, glitches in the Total Force Policy became readily apparent. The most visible, early on, was the delay in utilizing Title 10 U.S.C. 673b call-up authority. Consequently, the roundout program did not function as designed. For the ARNG roundout combat units the non-callup with their (AC) sponsor division seemed to be the end of the world. However, in retrospect, events during the fall of 1990 may have a more positive impact on the future of the ARNG than the initial Total Force Policy (TPF) creation. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to the following questions: (1) Will roundout continue as a policy? and (2) How can the ARNG leadership impact the decision-making process?

#### "BACK TO BASICS" PERSPECTIVE

In spite of what is written, stated, or insinuated, the two basic foundations of the ARNG upon which everything else emanates are; a citizen-soldier is the concept, and a reserve force is the

purpose. The mission statements of the ARNG specify a dual role. Simply stated they are:

- \* To function efficiently for the protection of life and property and to preserve peace, order, and public safety under State authorities.
- \* To maintain combat-ready units available to mobilize, deploy, fight and win in support of the National Military Strategy. to deter war.<sup>18</sup>

Until there is a radical deviation from the historical/traditional desires of the American people, everything the ARNG does can be traced back to one of the two mission foundations. The citizen, soldier, patriot concept remains unchanged. The local hometown American always has and always will respond to protect his family, his community, the State, and the Nation. The scope and mission, as a result of CAPSTONE, however, has changed to the point that the community-oriented organization is now a major part of our nation's frontline deterrence <sup>19</sup>

There is a widely held conviction that citizens would always turn out in sufficient numbers and in time to wage any sort of war successfully.<sup>20</sup> The TFP was, for the first time, tested as a result of the Persian Gulf crisis. The bottom line is that ARNG units and individuals were called-up and responded positively.

Another basic principle to be considered when answering questions about the future is the political implication. The use of the ARNG is a political statement not just a military decision. When Guardsmen are called for active duty, congressional constituents leave congressional districts. The decision makers reach out and touch the grassroot American. As a result a great deal of interest is generated at the local level. Part of the tradition concerning the use of reserves is that their use is tied to national resolve and public opinion.<sup>21</sup>

GEN Carl Vuono described the "back to basics" perspective in a speech to the National Guard Association of the United States he stated:

You are certainly no strangers to this role. One hundred years before we were a nation, citizen soldiers left hearth and home to stand against the perils of the frontier, and for more than three centuries, the men and women of the National Guard have embodied the spirit of sacrifice and commitment that has kept this nation free. Whether on the field of battle deciding the fate of nations or in domestic crises that touch the very lives of the American people, the National Guard takes a backseat to no one in courage and sacrifice. <sup>22</sup>

History and the Persian Gulf crisis once again proves ARNG soldiers and units will do their part and do it successfully. CAPSTONE and the roundout program makes the ARNG a part of the Total Army. Real world missions provide the necessary incentive to young men and women who serve in the all volunteer armed force. With few exceptions members of the RC have always

responded to the basic mission of providing support for the National Military Strategy. The premise for existence of the ARNG is basic: when needed citizen-soldiers are there.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

If for no other reason than austere fiscal funding, the CAPSTONE program with Directed Training Associations should remain in affect. There is enough cost analysis data to support the fact that reserve components are less expensive to maintain than the active Army. To the taxpayer, Congress, and military establishment CAPSTONE is a means to an end. For almost two decades it has been cost effective, provided a combat capable reserve and helped maintain active duty divisional flags.

Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM clearly identified the need for the early mobilization and deployment of the RC. Combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS), and individual volunteers responded magnificantly. When a need surfaced citizen-soldiers were ready. That part of the TFP is a resounding success. The deployment and employment of active combat units was conducted better than expected. However, without RC volunteers and CS and CSS units the procedure could have been disastrous. During the early stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM the following support skills were provided by the RC: food and water handling, surface transportation, cargo handling, medical services, construction, and intelligence.<sup>23</sup>

A careful analysis of the Persian Gulf crisis will reveal the reserve forces are an integral part of the military. As the President stated, "The Total Force Policy, which was established in 1973, allocates various military capabilities among the Active, Reserves and National Guard that together make up the armed forces of the United States."<sup>24</sup> The TFP is alive and well. While CAPSTONE and its roundout program may require some post-Persian Gulf crisis modification, it is our belief the changes will be positive and a total force effort.

Some assumptions are in order before any adjustments and or modifications can be considered.

- \* U.S. presence and influence will be required through-out the world to protect our national security interests. The Total Force Policy will continue to be the main stay of our military power element.

- \* The Soviet Union will continue to maintain a superpower military status.

- \* The national military strategy, to deter war, will not change but the threat will vary.

- \* The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under some configuration will remain a viable alliance.

- \* Air and sealift requirements will continue to exceed U.S. capability.

- \* Defense budgets will decline and stabilize with possible growth after 1995.

\* The selective service system will not go into effect until a full-mobilization order is received from the National Command Authority.

\* Active Army end strength will decline due to congressional budgetary action.

\* The ARNG will continue to have State and Federal missions.

\* The ARNG will assume an increased heavy combat force structure.

\* The active component force structure will sacrifice combat forces to increase combat support and combat service support capability.

\* Forward deployed active component units will be reduced requiring emphasis on contingency forces and mobilization deployment training.

\* Warning time for global confrontation will increase up to as much as twenty-four months.

\* Readiness levels, manning, and equipment modernization will be reduced for some active and reserve component units.

\* Military readiness goals will drive the active component. Military capability will drive the total force.

\* Cadre units will be created in both the Active and Reserve components.

\* The citizen-soldier concept will remain the single ingredient to show national will and resolve. Consistent with legislative history, Congress will continue to recognize funding of the reserve components as a positive investment.

## FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE PERSPECTIVES

Now that the crisis in the Persian Gulf has been resolved, Army force structure will require immediate attention; What will the future total force look like, and what role will the Reserve forces play in this structure.

Based on information from multiple sources, all components of the Army are going to become smaller. While exact end strength may vary, the AC will be approximately 535,000 and the Reserve Components (RC) around 550,000.<sup>25</sup> Quite a reduction from the current strength of 730,000 and 750,000 respectively. Of the 550,000 RC strength, the Department of the Army projects the ARNG end strength to be approximately 321,000 by FY 95.

If our assumptions are correct, then all components must work together to develop a military structure capable of responding to a clear shift in "mission" emphasis. While all missions may not be known at this time, some of the more likely are:

- \* Forward deployment, forward defense
- \* Projection of land forces/contingency operations
- \* Peacetime and wartime reinforcement
- \* Evacuation/protection of U.S. citizens
- \* Assistance to friendly nations
- \* Support of nation-building and civic action
- \* Support of counter-narcotics <sup>26</sup>

To meet these future missions numerous senior Army officers, speaking before the U.S. Army War College Class of 1991, have outlined a Base Force composed of 4 Corps with 20 divisions, with each Corps assigned a specific "type" mission.

One Corps would be CONUS based, "Crisis Response" Corps with five AC divisions able to respond rapidly, worldwide. The composition would be one airborne, one air assault, one light and two heavy divisions. The CS and CSS would also be all AC. Another Corps would be OCONUS, "Maintain Presence", with four AC divisions. These would most likely be one light and three heavy divisions. Two divisions would be stationed in Europe, one in Korea and one in Hawaii. The CS and CSS units would be primarily AC. A third Corps would be CONUS based, "Early Reinforcement", with three AC divisions available for response to protracted, large scale engagements. These divisions would be heavy, with CS and CSS elements from both the AC and RC. The fourth Corps would be a CONUS based "Follow-on Reinforcement" comprised of eight RC divisions. Six of the divisions would be fully manned and equipped, while the remaining two would be Cadre only. This Corps would only be used should global war become eminent. The CS and CSS units would be strictly RC.

While on the surface the proposal appears feasible, the end strength needed to support the AC portion of the plan exceeds projected active Army end strength. To determine the number of divisions that can be fielded, the Army utilizes an accounting tool called the Division Force Equivalent (DFE). A DFE is a fully-structured division with all support necessary to provide warfighting and sustaining capabilities. It includes the division and all nondivisional combat, combat support, and combat service support units required to support the division within the

theater of operations.<sup>27</sup> According to the 92-97 Program Objective Memorandum (POM), the DFE figure is 40,000.

As previously noted, by the end of 1995 the active Army's strength should be approximately 535,000, but not all are available or assigned to TOE type units. Those units that makeup the projected 12 AC divisions. If historical percentages hold true, then only 63% or about 337,000 troops will be assigned to TOE units; 24% or about 128,000 will be assigned to the TDA units; and the remaining 13% or approximately 70,000 will be distributed as either trainees, transients, holdees or students. Using simple arithmetic, it can be calculated the active Army will only have sufficient personnel to man approximately nine divisions. Logic therefore, dictates that additional personnel needed to "fillout" this shortfall will have to come from either the TDA units or RC.

If we accept the Army proposal that the Crisis Response Corps, to include its support elements, are primarily AC, then approximately 200,000 of the 337,000 TOE troops will be required to meet this commitment. This leaves only 137,000 TOE troops to fill the Maintain Presence and Early Reinforcement Corps seven divisions. Using the 40,000 DFE, the projected troop shortfall is approximately 143,000. It seems apparent that RC units will have to be utilized in some fashion to fill the void. The Army National Guard may not be able to retain all six combat roundout brigades, but in light of the projected shortfall, a case could be made for retaining five. The remaining shortage could be madeup by RC CS and CSS units.

While the final configurations of the future force structure may not be completely known for sometime, it appears obvious to the authors that Reserve forces will have an even more important role in the future Total Force Policy.

#### TRAINING/READINESS PERSPECTIVES

Training and readiness levels of the National Guard are a topic of debate and discussion. Points of view vary throughout the military and civilian community. Generally, the AC is considered better trained and maintained at a higher level of readiness than the RC. The CAPSTONE program, however, significantly reduced the gap. The program allowed RC units to focus training on wartime tasks as specified by the gaining command. Soldier skills improved and complimented the accomplishment of missions assigned to the unit. As a result of GAPSTONE implementation, the ARNG is becoming better trained and more ready, but because of limited number of training days not on an equal with the AC.

The irony of that statement is that although true it is also irrelevant. Why? Basically two reasons. First, the gap between AC/RC readiness and training becomes less significant because of three often overlooked aspects of the RC. Despite equipment shortages, geography, time, and lack of modernization, the greatest assets of the RC are; capability, continuity, and willingness to serve. These three historical and traditional features of the RC provide the valuable foundation of service to the nation. The RC is a combat capable and effective military

force. Given the same time and resources of the AC, the gap would virtually disappear.

Secondly, to simply state the Guard and Reserve is not ready because they do not have adequate equipment, personnel and training is insufficient. What makes the Guard ready is uniquely stated by Colonel Joseph Galioto in his Analytical Study Describing the Organizational Culture of the Army National Guard and its Effects on Readiness:

The readiness of the Guard is predicated on a value system that places emphasis on a freedom of a citizen to pursue his own interest, while, at the same time, providing for the common defense of one's neighborhood, community, town, state and nation. And, it is the unique characteristic of the Guard, as a military establishment, its dual role as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, that makes it such a formidable force.<sup>28</sup>

On the battlefield there will be no distinction between Guard, Reserve, or Active army soldiers. The Persian Gulf crisis of 1990 blurred the distinction significantly. The total force responded, not just one segment or component.

Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM provided an unexpected opportunity to test the TFP. These events have thrust the policy into the forefront of the Army's conscience and perhaps more important, into the congressional limelight as well.<sup>29</sup>

By not activating roundout combat units concern was created for the future of the Total Force Policy. That concern should have been overcome now by the professional performance of the RC soldiers themselves becoming a part of the total force effort.

The readiness/training question as far as it pertains to CS/CSS has been answered by Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Some doubt still remains concerning the combat units. Nevertheless, the nation's response was a total force success story. Lessons learned will initiate positive action for the improvement of readiness/training of our total forces. The majority of adjustments will be in force structure, mix and intergration. In the area of evaluating training/readiness a fine-tuned focus by FORSCOM will be required. FORSCOM/ARNG Reg. 350-2 specifies that the Commander, FORSCOM oversees and evaluates the training of the ARNG.<sup>30</sup> A renewed joint effort between FORSCOM and the Guard leadership will assure increased Guard readiness for the future.

The Director, Army National Guard, clearly laid-out the challenges ahead in his long range planning guidance by stating the following goals:<sup>31</sup>

1. Train units at level organized by making maximum use of the time available, emphasizing wartime missions and increasing the use of devices and simulators to enhance training effectiveness.

2. Maximize new technologies and local or regional training areas to achieve higher levels of MOS qualification and to increase individual skills on new equipment and doctrine.

3. Establish local training areas for all ARNG combat, combat support and combat service support units within thirty minutes one way driving distance for IDT training.

4. Train staffs and commanders in simulations and command post exercises to optimize available field training time.

5. Ensure collective training concentrates on mission essential tasks and includes deployment training.

6. Develop and field automated systems that will help to relieve the administrative burdens placed on commanders at all levels.

7. Develop multi-use ranges capable of integrating tactical unit live fire exercises with a variety of modernized weapons systems.

8. Pursue Overseas Deployment Training, Advanced Deployment Training Center activities and joint and combined exercises as the most realistic training available and the cornerstone of the unit training program.

9. Develop additional major training areas to support combat heavy and light divisions and separate brigades as well as support units.

Reserve Components, specifically the ARNG, readiness/training levels will always fluctuate unit to unit and individual to individual. However, as an organization and under continued professional leadership, it will provide organized, trained and equipped units to execute the orders of State and Federal Executives. Congressman G.V. Montgomery said it best,

There is virtually no limit to the level of readiness which can be achieved if the Guard is provided funding for sufficient exercise opportunities at all levels, adequate technicians and Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) manning and training and modern equipment.<sup>32</sup>

With a smaller active Army a certainty, now is the time to properly resource the total force. A total force to deter; and

if deterrence fails, mobilize, deploy, fight and win.

#### MOBILIZATION DEPLOYMENT PERSPECTIVES

The process of Mobilization/Deployment (Mob/Dep) is, to say the least, multifaceted. It has an elusive beginning, a dynamic progression, and an undefined ending. A predictable scenario would unfold as follows:

1. The National Guard and Army Reserve are activated.
2. The draft is initiated.
3. Cadres are taken first from Regular units, then Guard and Reserve units to form additional units (force structure) as determined necessary.
4. Draftees are assigned as fillers to forming units where they receive initial and advanced training.
5. Additional individual replacement training centers are activated and draftees are sent to these units for training and forwarded to combat units as replacements.<sup>33</sup>

Levels of mobilization, i.e. 200K call-up, partial and full, were created to react to possible threats to our national security ranging from limited regional conflicts to world war. U.S. military forces have practiced Mob/Dep exercises for years in different parts of the world; REFORGER in West Germany, BRIGHT STAR in Egypt, DISPLAY DETERMINATION in Italy, and TEAM SPIRIT in Korea. Every exercise provides new insight, lessons learned and lessons forgotten. The bottom line results are, if necessary, America can mobilize and deploy its forces.

The Persian Gulf crisis revealed convincingly all the years of hard work by the Mob/Dep planners wasn't wasted. Nonetheless, many senior military and civilian leaders were unfamiliar with the mobilization process.<sup>34</sup> The plans, however, were in place, only needing to be dusted off and read. Some required modification. Most importantly, Commander-In-Chief, CENTCOM's needs were met. Major Army Commanders and the Senior Civilian leadership, from a standing start, methodically met the challenge.

Budget cuts, down ramping, and TFP board study aside, Mob/Dep plans become reality. During the early phases of the Mob/Dep actions "red flags" began popping up everywhere. Air/Sea lift requirements exceeded capability. Active Component Combat Support and Combat Service Support requirements exceeded capability. The mere act of providing logistical support was a nightmare. ARNG roundout combat units were not called necessitating AC substitute brigades. The TFP and the One Army Policy appeared to be coming up short of expectations. Nevertheless, the command authorities overcame these "red flags" to put a force on the ground. Hindsight viewpoints, speculations, and critics could be dealt with at a later date.

Analysis of actions taken during the Persian Gulf crisis will provide much needed guidance for future Mob/Dep planning. One point has made its way to the surface that requires no study, under the current structure of the total force any response to a contingency must be a total force effort. A reduction in AC end strength will place more reliance on ARNG Readiness/Training and.

more importantly, on Mob/Dep preparedness. The leadership of the National Guard Bureau has always stressed Mob/Dep training. They recognize the ability to mobilize and deploy is the Guard's deterrence value. And if deterrence fails, knowledgeable military and civilian leaders must be made to realize the Guard is ready, capable, and willing to support, fight and win.

#### CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

Is the TFP still valid? Is CAPSTONE, with its Roundout and Affiliation Programs, viable? The answer to the first question can be answered with a simple, yes. Budget constraints simply will not allow a large standing active Army. The current TFP will continue to provide the flexibility for response to National Command Authority directives. An active Army, with augmentation and/or expansion forces from the RC and, if necessary draftees, will be able to respond to any threat on the operational continuum. A former Secretary of War in the early 1900's said:

The Regular Army is simply the peace nucleus of the Great War Army, and its strength and organization should always be considered with reference to its relation to the greater War Army, which cannot be placed in the field until war is imminent. The problem is one of expansion from a small peace force to a great war force. Its solution, therefore, involves the provision of a sufficient peace nucleus, the partial organization and training of citizen-soldiers in peace, and provisions for prompt and orderly expansion on the outbreak of war.<sup>35</sup>

The TFP will remain in affect to meet our nation's military power needs. The CAPSTONE question needs further analysis.

Prior to the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990, CAPSTONE provided

reasonable answers to reasonable questions. It was a program well thought-out and implemented. Lack of time and equipment modernization, and resulting lower readiness levels in the Guard were recognized risks. Although never acceptable, the risks were tolerated as long as improvement could be documented. The Guard of the 1990's barely resembles the Guard of the early seventies. The question now is will CAPSTONE survive in light of shortcomings identified in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. It is the opinion of the authors there is nothing functionally wrong with the CAPSTONE program. However, some adjustments and/or modifications are warranted in order to maintain its viability.

The Persian Gulf crisis should be used to identify needed changes and not only to justify maintaining the status-quo. One congressional staff aide stated the concept should be eliminated immediately.<sup>36</sup> An education process must be initiated for such uninformed congressional, and some military leaders, concerning CAPSTONE. The program never envisioned immediate deployment of combat Roundout units. A combat Roundout unit simply cannot be considered fully combat ready with only thirty-nine training days a year. Train-up is a must! European wartime plans gave Guard units the needed time.

The rapidity of events in the Persian Gulf crisis were never planned for, and consequently, didn't fit neatly into a European-like scenario. Units were needed immediately. Training time was simply not available. As a result, the effectiveness of the Roundout program was never tested. Now Congressional and Active Army leaders are questioning the validity of the program. It is

our opinion, the Persian Gulf crisis presented the opportunity to mold the future of CAPSTONE, not eliminate the program. Most influential leaders of today were not in their current position when CAPSTONE was initiated. Their support must be obtained through a positive course of CAPSTONE education.

Some additional conclusions/recommendations and points to consider are as follows:

- \* A TFP provides the flexibility necessary to respond to any contingency throughout the world. The CAPSTONE program is instrumental in permitting the Guard to maintain the highest state of readiness in our nation's history. We can ill-afford to slip to the readiness levels that existed in the 1950's and 1960's.

- \* Reserves are of limited value if not used. If not used, justification to the taxpayer and Congress for their continuation will be difficult. Additionally, the vitality and viability of the reservists themselves will be in jeopardy. The National Guard, therefore, should be used in any contingency operation that exceeds the capability of the Active force.

- \* The call-up authority under section 673b of Title 10, US Code needs to be permanently changed. Specifically, the "90 + 90" rule does not allow sufficient time for Guard combat units to mobilize, train-up, and deploy. If the law isn't changed, it is the opinion of the authors that when a contingency exceeds the capability of the active forces then a national emergency should be declared.

- \* The programmed CONUS based Contingency Corps should have

self-sufficient combat support and combat service support within its structure. Additionally, the Corps should have an AC cadre, heavy division rounded-out with Guard mechanized and armored brigades. For example, the 2nd Armored Division was scheduled to be deactivated. Rather than deactivate the division, make it a cadre division with AC command and staff elements, but round it out with ARNG combat brigades. Combat support and combat service support for the division would be RC. Missions could include a rapid deployable Corps reserve, rapid show of heavy forces, etc.

\* A Senior DA staff member stated to the Army War College class of 1991 that as much emphasis must be initiated by the armed forces on preparing to go to war as they do for conducting war. Mobilization and Deployment planning and exercises must receive top-down emphasis.

\* A cross-fertilization of Active, Guard and Reserve leaders would improve knowledge and capability in all components. The leadership of any designated active or reserve cadre unit should rotate into C-1 level units for periods of training, exercises, etc.

\* A reduction of forward deployed forces, coupled with a smaller overall active force, will free-up significant amounts of military equipment. Priority must be given to utilizing that equipment for RC modernization. An organized plan must be developed for integrating the new equipment. The Reserve Components must become a first class modern force, on an equal with the active forces.

\* Revamp the FORSCOM 1R evaluation process. A clear line of responsibility for RC readiness and evaluation must be established and enforced

\* The Guard leadership should seriously consider changing its current force structure. While the ARNG might want to mirror the active Army, deviation from that desire might be necessary. If proposed missions and force structure changes as predicted, then it seems there will be a need for more RC CS and CSS units. If the Guard's desire is to continue its active role in the IFP, and in contingency operations, the expansion of supporting missions provide that opportunity.

\* Another consideration is centering the Roundout program around combat battalions rather than brigade sized units. Battalions would be more easily deployable and trainable than a Brigade.

\* The "Reverse Roundout" concept developed in the mid-eighties by former CSA GEN John A. Wickham, Jr. deserves another look. In short the concept proposes that National Guard Divisions be roundedout by AC brigades. This concept retains division flags, and, as the active force is reduced, allows force structure of both components to be used more wisely.

The immediate future of our armed forces and the conclusion of this project can be summarized by a quote from President Bush:

Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to these changing strategic circumstances...We know our forces can be smaller, but we would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess...What we need are not merely reductions but restructuring.<sup>37</sup>

THE ROUNDOUT CONCEPT  
AND THE NATIONAL GUARD

1. Does roundout work for your Brigade? Yes No? Explain.

2. What is your Brigades mission today?

2a. Will it? How will it change in response to the changed threat?

2b. Will it? How will it change in response to changing force structure?

3. What do you see as training priorities for these missions? How are these different from your current priorities?

4. What do you see as future training strategies for these missions?

QUESTIONNAIRE (cont.)

5. What support will be required from the AG division to enable your Brigade to achieve these training objectives?

5a. What support will be required from NGB to obtain these training objectives?

6. Do you believe NG combat units can be used as rapid response contingency forces for short duration conflicts? Please explain.

7. Do you feel NG units should be used in a "forward defense" posture? Please explain.

8. Do you feel the NG has the appropriate force mix for tomorrow's mission?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Not sure \_\_\_\_\_

If no, please explain, ie. combat verses combat support, heavy verses light.

QUESTIONNAIRE (cont.)

9. Is there a meaningful role for ARNG combat forces in today's Army? Please explain.

10. Have you attended any of the following. Please indicate all you've attended and year.

year  
SPDOC \_\_\_\_\_  
RONSIS \_\_\_\_\_  
AGNSS \_\_\_\_\_  
None of the above \_\_\_\_\_

11. Additional comments:

Thank you for your cooperation.

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